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Abstract
The paper evaluates the convergence paths of Central and Eastern European mem-
ber states of the EU during the 2010s, when the main task for these countries was 
avoiding the middle-income trap—when wages are not so low anymore to compete 
with less developed countries, while innovation is not developed enough yet to com-
pete with developed countries. Using various statistical indicators, the paper shows 
that while most countries in the region have been on a convergence path during the 
decade under analysis, not all succeeded in avoiding the trap. While some countries 
successfully implemented policies to step on the path of productivity- and innova-
tion-led growth (Czechia, Slovenia, Estonia, and Lithuania), in several other states, 
growth was supported mainly by low costs and loose monetary conditions including 
significant transfers from the EU. The comparative analysis of Estonia and Hungary 
illustrates the different growth models and shows how the institutional system plays 
a key role in exiting the trap.
Keywords Central and Eastern Europe · Economic convergence · Estonia · Growth 
models · Hungary · Middle-income trap
Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic and the ensuing economic crisis ended a decade-long 
period of growth around the world and the Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
region, which warrants taking stock. This study provides an overview of the devel-
opmental paths of the 11 Central and Eastern European Member States during the 
2010s: Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Croatia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia (EU-11). The paper aims to answer three closely 
related questions. 1. What were the main characteristics of convergence in the region 
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during the 2010s? 2. Have the EU-11 succeeded in overcoming the problem of the 
so-called middle-income trap (MIT)? If so, what strategies have been used? 3. What 
role did the institutional system play in this process?
To answer the three questions, first I present some stylized facts about the conver-
gence performance of the EU-11. Then, to explain the differences in performance, 
I will provide a theoretical summary of the problem of the MIT, discuss different 
growth models and the role of institutions in the process. “Divergent growth models 
in the EU-11” section examines the experiences of the EU-11 over the past decade 
based on the theory of MIT. It is shown that there are two distinct growth mod-
els emerging in the region—a high-road model that prioritises institution building, 
improvements in knowledge, quality and productivity, and a low-road model, which 
focuses on increasing demand and cost advantage. To illustrate the differences 
between the two models and the role of institutions in choosing among growth mod-
els, I compare the cases of Hungary and Estonia. The main finding of the paper is 
that high-quality institutions are necessary for overcoming the MIT, but given the 
challenges of institutional change, the MIT has not been overcome everywhere in 
the region thus growth based on low costs and favourable financial conditions persist 
even though it cannot be considered sustainable.
Convergence performance of the EU‑11 during the 2010s
At the time of post-Communist transition, the promise of freedom and welfare inter-
twined—most citizens equated democracy and capitalism with the standard of living 
in Western countries such as Austria. Accession to the European Union (EU) also 
fuelled these expectations, as the free movement of goods, capital, labour, services 
and technology promote convergence (Sala-i-Martin 1996). Given their lower ini-
tial level of income EU-11 countries were expected to grow faster than old member 
states (β-convergence), which helps to reduce the dispersion of per capita income 
within the EU (σ-convergence). Nevertheless, 30 years after the transition, none of 
the post-Communist countries have achieved even the average level of development 
of the EU, let alone that of Austria. This is illustrated by Fig. 1, which shows that 
although there has been a significant increase in GDP between 1995 and 2019, Aus-
tria also developed rapidly and thus the distance barely decreased.
While catching up with Austria has proven to be elusive, convergence has still 
taken place. Figure  2 shows changes in GDP per capita adjusted for purchasing 
power standard (PPS) between 2010 and 2019—after the global financial crisis and 
before the COVID-19 pandemic. All countries except Slovakia moved closer to 
the EU average (σ-convergence), with Czechia being the closest to catch up to the 
EU-27 average.
The concept of β-convergence predicts that the larger the initial difference from the 
EU average, the steeper a country’s growth curve can be. Thus, to evaluate convergence 
performance during the 2010s, the initial level of development needs to be considered. 
Table  1 ranks countries based on their 2019 GDP/capita levels. The ‘Convergence’ 
indicator shows the percentage of the gap that was closed relative to the EU-27 average 
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Fig. 1  GDP/capita in the EU-11 and Austria, 1995–2019 (current prices, international dollars/capita). 








2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Bulgaria Czechia Estonia Croatia
Latvia Lithuania Hungary Poland
Romania Slovenia Slovakia EU-27
Fig. 2  Convergence in the EU-11 2010–2019 (GDP/capita PPS). Data: Eurostat (data code: TEC00114)
1 The results depend strongly on the base year. 2010 was chosen because by then all the countries in the 
region had been through the biggest shock of the financial crisis and the recovery started (Fig. 1).
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2010, which means that there was a 39 percentage points gap to close before catching 
up. By 2019, it had reached 82% of the EU-27 average, thus the gap was reduced to 18 
percentage point. The 21-percentage point difference is 53,8% of the road to catch up.
There is a significant heterogeneity in the convergence performance of the EU-11. 
Two Baltic States (Lithuania and Estonia) and Czechia performed the best as they 
closed over 50% of their development gap during the past decade. Romania and Latvia 
also performed well and closed around third of the gap. Poland, Hungary and Slovenia 
are in the middle with performances between 20 and 30%, while Bulgaria and Croatia 
are poor performers with 16% and 12.5% respectively. While Slovakia was a success 
story in the 2000s, in the 2010s its performance deteriorated compared to the region, 
and it is the sole country that have a lower level of development relative to the EU-27 
average than in 2010.
When assessing the performance in GDP per capita, it is also worth considering 
changes in the population. As can be seen from the table, Slovakia is one of only three 
countries (alongside Czechia and Slovenia) that have been able to increase their pop-
ulation over the past decade, while other countries (especially Lithuania and Latvia) 
have caught up on a GDP/capita basis with rapidly declining populations.
What explains this heterogeneity? To address this question, first I will review the 
literature on the MIT and the most important lessons for the region.
The limits to FDI‑led growth, the MIT, and institutions
Due to the lack of capital and technology, which characterized post-Communist 
countries at the time of transition, they relied on foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and export-oriented growth to achieve convergence. Hungary and Estonia played a 
Table 1  Convergence performance in the EU-11, 2010–2019
Data: GDP/capita PPS: Eurostat (code: TEC00114), convergence: own calculation, real GDP/capita: 


















84 92 8 50 18,330 1.6
Slovenia 85 88 3 20 20,700 1.8
Estonia 66 84 18 52,9 15,760 –0.5
Lithuania 61 82 21 53,8 14,010 –13
Slovakia 76 74 –2 –8,3 15,860 0.4
Poland 63 73 10 27 13,020 –1.3
Hungary 66 73 7 20,5 13,270 –2.7
Latvia 53 69 16 34 12,510 –11
Romania 52 69 17 35,4 9110 –6
Croatia 60 65 5 12,5 12,450 –5.2
Bulgaria 44 53 9 16,1 6840 –6.4
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leading role in stepping on this path, but after the failure of the ideas of national cap-
italism, Czechia, Slovakia, Poland, and Slovenia also opted for this strategy (Csaba, 
2005: 112–113). This model was also encouraged by the process of accession to 
the European Union—privatization and facilitation of FDI inflows were important 
aspects of evaluation (Medve-Bálint, 2014: 42). No alternative had emerged.
By the end of the first decade of the 2000s, a distinct model of capitalism devel-
oped in the post-Communist countries that does not fit into the categories used to 
describe the old member states of the EU (Farkas, 2016: 173). CEE countries shared 
three common features: shortage of capital and management skills, weak civil soci-
ety, and the influence of the EU and other international organizations (Farkas, 2016: 
175). Advanced technology is present in FDI-dominated sectors, where investors 
benefit from relatively cheap but skilled labor, access to new markets and the EU 
regulatory environment (Jirasavetakul and Rahman, 2018: 5–6). However, the pro-
ductivity of the domestic economy lags foreign-dominated sectors, which means 
that a dual economic structure became characteristic to varying degrees everywhere 
in the region (Farkas, 2016: 211). Divergence in the region can be found primarily 
in the ratio of state redistribution, which ranges from 35 to 50% of GDP (see Fig. 4 
in the next section).
By the 2010s, however, it had become increasingly clear that the post-transition 
growth model was becoming obsolete (Galgóczy and Drahokoupil 2017). The first 
major sign of this problem was during the global financial crisis, which started in 
2008—compared to the previous periods, FDI flows decreased significantly across 
the world. As multinationals are increasingly looking for skilled labor, the lack of 
investment in education and the loss of population in several countries make it dif-
ficult to attract new FDI. A specialization in labor-intensive, lower value-added 
activities in global value chains can be an additional drawback of FDI-based growth. 
Finally, Industry 4.0 innovations, such as the rise of robots, 3D printing, artificial 
intelligence and digitalization are likely to further reduce efficiency-seeking FDI 
flows, which are primarily attracted by cheap labor.
The limitations of growth based on foreign technology and cheap labor are 
addressed in the concept of MIT. The phenomenon was first described by Garrett 
(2004), who pointed out that in the 1980s and 1990s, per capita income growth in 
middle-income countries was barely half of the growth in high-income countries 
and one-eighth of that of low-income countries. The reason is that their wages are 
no longer so low that they have a competitive advantage, while their innovation per-
formance is not yet strong enough to compete with developed countries. The con-
cept of MIT was first used by Gill and Kharas (2007), who considered it suitable 
for explaining the development problems of East Asia, the Middle East, and Latin 
America. They pointed to two forms of the trap: forcing export-oriented growth 
based on cheap labor, even after the wage advantage was lost, and the hasty leap 
towards a knowledge economy with weak universities, limited human capital, and 
waste of budgetary resources due to corruption and rule of law problems (Gill and 
Kharas 2015: 7).
Initially, the MIT concept was applied only below a certain level of development. 
However, due to widespread popularity of the concept in scholarly and media cir-
cles, it eventually obtained a much broader meaning. Nowadays, it basically refers 
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to the lack of convergence to target countries, and it is this meaning, which has been 
widely applied to the CEE region (Pruchnik and Zowczak 2017: 2).
Recognizing the limitations of growth based on cheap labor and the importance 
of innovation is an important message of the MIT concept for economic policy. This 
idea is not new, of course, since Porter (1990) had already demonstrated the stages 
of competitive development long before: factor-oriented development is followed by 
the investment-driven phase and then innovation becomes decisive. Different fac-
tors contribute to competitiveness at different levels of development. One of the 
most recent approaches to the competitiveness of national economies is provided 
by Aiginger (2018), who distinguishes two types of competitiveness. Low-road 
competitiveness is focused on low costs (wages and taxes), subsidies for FDI inflow 
and aims for jobs and GDP growth. High-road competitiveness focuses on quality, 
sophisticated products, high level of productivity, which rely on innovation, quality 
education and a favorable business environment. The aim is improving the quality of 
life. Table 2 provides an overview about the two models of competitiveness.
Based on the distinction between low-road and high-road competitiveness, the 
problem of MIT can be understood as a failure to convert from a growth model 
focusing on low costs to a model, which prioritizes high quality and innovation. 
Numerous economic policy recommendations have been made to address the MIT 
problem. Gill and Kharas (2015) provides a summary, which includes technologi-
cal convergence, innovation, improving the skills of the labor force, livable cities 
and strengthening institutions. In the context of the latter, the authors highlight 
democratization, the fight against corruption, strengthening social cohesion, reduc-
ing inequality, and increasing government efficiency. In addition, experience has 
shown that demographic processes, entrepreneurship, and regional integration are 
also important. However, despite the knowledge about this long list of factors, the 
MIT persists, thus the question remains: why some countries can solve the prob-
lems, while others remain trapped?
Lately, the deeper, social, and institutional causes of the trap came into focus. 
Dollar (2016) points out that although there is a strong correlation between insti-
tutional quality and the level of development, the volatility of growth is far greater 
than that of institutions. Consequently, the question is not the level of institutional 
quality, but rather the quality of institutions relative to the level of development. He 
argues that rapid development becomes possible when a country succeeds in estab-
lishing higher quality institutions than could be expected from its income level. 
This also implies that institutional quality should be constantly improved to achieve 
steady convergence to target countries.
The focus on institutions in exiting the MIT is well in line with the institutional 
turn in economics since the 1990s. According to Douglass North (1990: 6) “the 
major role of institutions in a society is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable 
(but not necessarily efficient) structure to human interaction.” This insight did not 
remain at a theoretical level but has been emphasized in policymaking as well. In 
2002 the World Bank identified three major channels, which support market func-
tioning: providing information on market conditions, goods, and participation; defin-
ing and enforcing property rights and contracts; and increase or decrease in competi-
tion on a certain market (World Bank 2002: 8). However, a state, which is capable 


















































































































































































































































































































of enforcing contracts, can also abuse its power and jeopardize property rights. 
Thus there is a need for ‘restraint on government tyranny’, which means the rule of 
law (Tamahana 2004: 115). Historically it has three core elements: the government 
must respect the law; the laws are public, prospective, general and applied equally; 
and an independent judiciary is responsible for enforcing the law (Tamahana 2004: 
114–126). The rule of law is not the only type of constraint on the state. The ratio of 
state redistribution also influences the autonomy of the state. A larger state provides 
more opportunities for corruption, abuse of power than a smaller state, although in 
other cases large governments provide high-quality services, which increase social 
cohesion and generate trust. For this reason, it is important to analyze the size of 
government and the quality of state institutions together (Győrffy 2018: 199). In an 
environment with limited government and high-quality institutions, where contracts 
are enforced and property is secure, entrepreneurs can flourish and drive innovation, 
which improves productivity and leads to economic growth (Ács et al. 2018: 505).
In their survey Haggard et  al. (2008) find robust evidence for the link between 
long-term economic development and security of property rights ensured by the 
legal system. However, they warn against viewing rule of law as a technology and 
underline the complexity of institutions, which “rest upon deep coalitions of con-
senting interests” (221). This insight explains why an import of formal institutions 
often fails and past institutional practices are persistent. North (2005: 62) defines 
this phenomenon as path dependence, which “will occur because the direction of the 
incremental institutional change will be broadly consistent with the existing institu-
tional matrix … and will be governed by the kinds of knowledge and skills that the 
entrepreneurs and members of organization have invested in.”
Research on the MIT is consistent with the insights of institutional economics on 
the difficulties of institutional change. Doner and Schneider (2016) underline that 
the actors, who benefit from the low-cost model, are not necessarily interested in 
institutional changes. Furthermore, establishing a high-quality education and R&D 
system requires much more complex policies than giving tax relief for multinational 
corporations attracted by low wages. The dual economy also creates significant ine-
qualities in the system, which make it difficult to cooperate for a common purpose. 
The beneficiaries of the system, including employers of the low-wage workers and 
the rent-seeking policymakers do not have any interest in facilitating the changes. In 
such an environment, the developmental trap and the institutional trap reinforce each 
other.
A low-quality institutional environment however does not necessarily imply low 
level of growth—at least not in the short-term. As Baccaro and Pontusson (2016) 
show there are several possible models of growth even in the absence of productiv-
ity growth. While they apply their framework to developed countries, the various 
models are also open to countries dealing with the MIT. Wages can be kept artifi-
cially low, which sustains export competitiveness such as in Germany, or an increase 
in wage-share or credit can finance consumption such as in the UK. Sweden has the 
most balanced model focusing on knowledge-intensive and high value-added sectors 
that ensure robust growth for both exports and consumption. The EU-11 countries 
have some additional opportunities for growth. The influx of transfers from the EU 
can also lead to investments and increasing demand. In the short term, non-eurozone 
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countries can improve competitiveness by devaluation, which makes domestic prod-
ucts cheaper abroad thus provides a cost advantage for producers. In the longer term, 
however, the link between financial conditions and growth is much more nuanced. 
Readily available resources may finance investments, which are profitable only dur-
ing the expansive and peak stages of the business cycle. The emergence of vari-
ous asset price bubbles on the stock or real estate market due to cheap funding can 
also be dangerous and lead to a crisis, as they collapse when monetary conditions 
tighten. An undervalued exchange rate is not necessarily a lasting solution to com-
petitiveness either, as continued devaluation can have an inflationary effect, while it 
reduces the incentives for companies to increase productivity and innovate.
Overall, we can expect high-road, quality-growth in countries where we can see 
a steady improvement in institutional quality. In the absence of such improvement, 
growth is still possible based on costs or lax monetary conditions. If neither institu-
tions, nor lax monetary conditions are present, we can expect economic stagnation. 
In the following section indicators of the various growth models are analyzed in the 
EU-11.
Divergent growth models in the EU‑11
Institutional quality and entrepreneurship
Figure 3 provides an overview about the evolution of the rule of law in the EU-11 
between 2010 and 2019 based on the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators 
(WGI). The rule of law is conceptualized as capturing “perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular 
the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as 
well as the likelihood of crime and violence”.2
There were three groups in 2010: the Southern countries (Bulgaria, Romania and 
Croatia) were lagging behind, Estonia, Czechia and Slovenia were at the forefront, 
while Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia were in the middle. Nearly 
a decade later, the midfield split in two, with Latvia and Lithuania catching up with 
the frontrunners, while Hungary, Poland and Slovakia deteriorating with Romania 
catching up with them. Bulgaria remains far behind in the region as its institutions 
have mostly stagnated at low levels over the decade.
Considering the level of total government expenditure and rule of law together 
(Fig.  4) provides a clearer picture about the changing constraints on government 
power.
Total government expenditure decreased almost everywhere among the EU-11. 
Countries in the frontrunner group all improved their rule of law index, and they 
also succeeded in decreasing the redistribution rate—all of them are below 45% of 
GDP, and the three Baltic states are below 40%. While the size of the state decreased 
2 For a description of the rule of law indicator, see the World Governance Indicators website: www. 











2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Bulgaria Czechia Estonia Croatia Poland Latvia
Lithuania Hungary Romania Slovakia Slovenia
Fig. 3  Rule of law index in the EU-11 (2010–2019) Notes: the figure shows the estimations for the World 
Governance Indicators rule of law index, which ranges between −2,5 and 2,5. Data: www. govin dicat ors. 
org
Fig. 4  Changes in the rule of law index and total government redistribution (% GDP) in the EU-11 
2010–2019. Note: the blue squares at the starting point of the arrows show the 2010 rule of law and total 
government expenditure combination, and the arrows end with the 2019 combination. Data: rule of law: 
see Fig. 3, total government expenditure rate: Eurostat (code TEC00023)
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in Croatia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia as well, it is on average greater than in the 
first group. Together with their mostly deteriorating rule of law scores, we can con-
clude that the state is much less constrained in these countries than in the first group. 
Romania stands apart from both groups—it is converging to the second group in 
rule of law, while its low rate of state redistribution puts it closer to the frontrunners.
On Fig.  5 we can see a strong correlation between entrepreneurial attitudes 
and the ratio of state redistribution—countries with a low redistribution rate have 
stronger entrepreneurial attitudes. Lithuania has the highest score, which has con-
verged to the EU average the most dynamically in the last decade.
Innovation and the quality of education
Between 2010 and 2020, there was no significant change in the fact that the 
EU-11 countries are less innovative than the old Member States. According to 
the European Innovation Scoreboard3 only Estonia belongs to the second group 
of Strong Innovators, which includes France and Germany. On the other end of 
the spectrum, we find Romania and Bulgaria as Modest Innovators, which per-
form below 50% of the EU average in almost all indicators. Other countries 
in the region are among the Moderate Innovators, performing between 50 and 
100% of the EU average. From the perspective of MIT, the innovation perfor-
mance of domestic small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is of paramount 
importance. Figure 6 shows the innovation index of the EU-11 and the proportion 
of innovative SMEs. Except for Estonia and Lithuania, the share of innovative 
SMEs is below the EU average everywhere, with 6 countries (Slovakia, Hungary, 









































Fig. 5  Total government expenditures and entrepreneurial attitudes in the EU-11 (2019). Data: World 
Economic Forum (2019) Attitudes towards entrepreunial risk indicator in the country profiles; total gov-
ernment expenditures: see Fig. 4
3 The report and annual data are available at: https:// ec. europa. eu/ growth/ indus try/ policy/ innov ation/ 
score boards_ en. Accessed: March 31, 2021.
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Latvia, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania) below 40% of the EU average. The figure 
also shows the employment rate in high-tech manufacturing and services as well 
as the share of graduates in the 30–34 age group. As we can see there is only a 
moderate relationship with either the innovation index or the proportion of inno-
vative SMEs. Hungary is one of the leaders in the high-tech employment indica-
tor together with Estonia and Czech Republic even if it has a low share of innova-
tive SMEs and a relatively low share of people with tertiary degree. This anomaly 
can be explained by the presence of foreign-owned companies in high-tech manu-
facturing sectors such as the auto industry. However, as Drahokoupil and Fabo 
(2020: 4) show, foreign-owned firms’ contribution to skill development is limited 
even for sophisticated products as assembly platform specialization requires little 
creative work from employees. Digital skills and creative work are required in 
domestic, cutting edge services sector, which underlines the significance of inno-
vative SMEs.
A high-quality education system is an essential condition for high-road competi-
tiveness. Educational standards can be assessed through the PISA surveys carried 
out by OECD, which measures the performance of 15-year-old students in reading, 
mathematics, and science. Figure 7 shows the results of the 2009 and 2018 PISA 
tests for the EU-11.
The highest scores were registered by Estonia, which even increased its perfor-
mance over the past decade and is one of the top performers in the world due to 
its strong focus on educational reforms (Avlijas 2020: 629). Poland also recorded 
steady improvement in all three areas. On the other hand, we can observe mostly 
















Innovation index Innovative SMEs (% EU average )
Tertiary education among 30-34 Employment in high-tech sectors (rhs)
Fig. 6  Selected indicators of innovation in the EU-11 (2019). Data: Innovation: European Commission, 
European Innovation Scoreboard interactive data analysis: https:// inter activ etool. eu/ EIS/ EIS_2. html#, 
Tertiary educational attainment among age group 30–34: Eurostat (code: T2020_41), Employment in 
high-tech manufacturing and knowledge-intersive services as % of total employment: Eurostat (code: 
htec_emp_nat2)
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all three areas in Slovakia and Hungary. In the remaining countries we can see both 
progress and decline.
Wages and productivity
The capacity for innovation and high-quality education contribute to productivity 
growth, which determines wage levels and economic demand in the longer term. 
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2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
EU27 Bulgaria Czechia Estonia
Croatia Latvia Lithuania Hungary
Poland Romania Slovenia Slovakia
Fig. 8  Labor productivity in the EU-11 (2010–2019). Notes: Labour productivity per person employed 
and hour worked (EU27 = 100) Eurostat code: TESEM160
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As we can see, the EU27 average has not yet been approached by any country 
of the region. The closest one is Czechia, which showed steady convergence over 
the past decade. The three Baltic States and Romania are also catching up rapidly. 
The latter has outpaced Hungary, which, together with Slovakia, has diverged from 
the EU27 average. Over the past decade, Poland was the only country, which regis-
tered dynamic productivity growth and has almost caught up with Slovenia despite 
its weakening institutional system and deteriorating rule of law.
Figure 9 shows a strong link between labor productivity and hourly wages, but 
this relationship is not perfect. While Slovenia and Bulgaria are well above the trend 
line, indicating more consumption-led growth, most countries in the region, espe-
cially Czechia, Poland, Lithuania, and Romania are well below it, which implies an 
export-oriented growth path.
The financial conditions of growth
As discussed in the theoretical section, lax monetary conditions can also contrib-
ute to growth although long-term sustainability is highly questionable. A partial 
picture of the financial conditions for growth is provided by Fig. 10, which exam-
ines two indicators together: the level of net EU transfers as a percentage of gross 
national income (GNI) and the change in the value of the national currency, meas-
ured through AMECO’s purchasing power standards (PPS). The figure shows that 
there were significant differences in the financial conditions for growth in the region. 
Slovenia and Czechia developed with stable money and EU transfers less than 2% of 
their respective GNI. The three Baltic countries received EU transfers between 3 and 
4% of their GNI, while they also experienced a decrease in the purchasing power of 
money, which means rising prices even after introducing the euro. Bulgaria faced 
similar financial conditions. Croatia was the only country among the EU-11, where 
the purchasing power of the national currency increased over the past decade due to 



































Fig. 9  Hourly wages and labor productivity in the EU-11 (2019). Data: productivity see Fig. 8, wages: 
Eurostat (code: lc_lci_lev)
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the euroization of its financial system.4 Poland and Slovakia are around average in 
terms of both EU transfers and exchange rate changes. The loosest monetary condi-
tions were in Romania and Hungary—both registered around 20% reduction in the 
purchasing power of the currency and significant transfers from the EU—annually 
Romania received 2%, Hungary 3.99% as a proportion of GNI, the latter being the 
highest in the region.
Figure 10 tells only a partial story of monetary conditions. Beyond official trans-
fers, countries in the region also received significant amount of remittances from 
those, who went to work abroad primarily to other EU countries. As emphasized by 
Csaba (2019: 10), the inflow in remittances is often comparable in magnitude to offi-
cial transfers. In 2020 remittances as % of GDP ranged from 0,9% in Poland to 6,4% 
in Croatia with an average of 2,47% in the EU-11.5
Based on these numbers, we can see that the financial conditions of growth do 
not indicate a strong relationship with convergence performance. Loose monetary 
conditions can temporarily boost demand, but they do not necessarily contribute to 





















































Fig. 10  Net EU-transfers and change in the purchasing power of national currency in the EU-11 (2010–
2019). Data: own calculation based on European Commission budget data: https:// ec. europa. eu/ budget/ 
graphs/ reven ue_ exped iture. html Change in the purchasing power of national currency: own calculation 
based on Ameco GDP purchasing power parities, national currency units per purchasing power standard 
2010/2019.
4 Croatia has the highest level of euroisation in deposits and payments among non-eurozone EU coun-
tries (Dumičič, Ljubaj and Martinis 2018: 2), which limits the possibility for devaluation. Instead internal 
devaluation can be used to reduce costs, which means that wages grow at a lower rate than productivity. 
This is shown by the fact that while the purchasing power of the Croatian kuna increased, the real effec-
tive exchange rate (REER) decreased from 120,1 in 2010 to 98,8 by 2019 (2015 = 100). In contrast, the 
Hungarian forint was devalued by 25% nominally, but the REER only decreased from 110,3 to 103,4 dur-
ing the same period (AMECO database). The devaluation of the forint made it possible for the govern-
ment to implement popular wage increases without the loss of cost competitiveness.
5 Own calculation based on World Bank data available at: https:// www. world bank. org/ en/ topic/ migra 
tionr emitt ances diasp orais sues/ brief/ migra tion- remit tances- data.
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Different growth models and the quality of life
Based on the previous sections, we can see that behind the steady convergence 
performances in the CEE region, three different paths can be observed. The most 
successful countries were those, where strong institutions, a focus on knowledge 
and favorable financial conditions have all contributed to growth. Czechia, Slove-
nia, Estonia, and Lithuania belong to this group. These countries have successfully 
resolved the problems presented by MIT and they have been able to pursue a growth 
model based on knowledge and quality. Convergence was possible for other coun-
tries as well, where institutions are weak or deteriorating. Romania and Hungary are 
the best examples. Their growth is based primarily on low costs and requires signifi-
cant influx of financial resources as well as periodic devaluation. They are still in the 
MIT and this path is unlikely to be sustainable in the long-term. Countries, where 
there was little improvement in institutions or education, and financial conditions 
were less favorable, performed much weaker—Croatia, Bulgaria, Slovakia belong to 
this group.
However, growth is not the ultimate objective of economic activity. The issue of 
living standards is much more important for the population. This is expressed by the 
UN Human Development Index (HDI), which provides a combined assessment of 
life expectancy, education, and income.
Table 3 shows how it evolved between 2010 and 2020 in the EU-11 countries. 
In 9 of the EU-11 countries, HDI rankings improved in the 2010s—three of the 
region’s best performing countries are already in the top 30 countries in the world 
(Slovenia, Czechia, Estonia). Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia also improved signifi-
cantly and made the top 40. Slovakia is in this group as well, but it is also one of the 
two countries, which did not improve, and dropped from 31st place in 2010 to 39th 
place by 2020. Hungary also fell from 36 to  40th place. Croatia is not far behind as 
it improved from 51 to 43th. The position of Romania and Bulgaria is largely stable.
Overall, a competitiveness strategy, which prioritizes institutional development 
and quality, is not only associated with better growth performance, but also with a 
Table 3  The ranking of EU-11 
countries based on the Human 
Development Index (HDI) 2010, 
2020
Source: UNDP (2010) and UNDP (2020)
Country 2010 2020 Δ
Slovenia 29 22  + 7
Czechia 28 27  + 1
Estonia 34 29  + 5
Lithuania 44 34  + 12
Poland 41 35  + 6
Latvia 48 37  + 11
Slovakia 31 39 –8
Hungary 36 40 –4
Croatia 51 43  + 8
Romania 50 49  + 1
Bulgaria 58 56  + 2
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better quality of life. Only Poland appears to be the exception in this regard, where, 
despite the deterioration of the rule of law indicator, there has been excellent per-
formance both in terms of growth and HDI. This can be explained by the fact that 
between 1990 and 2015 successive governments built a system committed to free 
market and capitalism, which kept the country on a steady growth path. As Mag-
yar and Madlovics (2020: 650–651) explain, even after 2015 the economy was 
mostly left intact and loyal members of the ruling party are rewarded by office and 
not wealth. It is a very different case from Hungary even with a similar rule of law 
deterioration.
The next section will look deeper into the Hungarian case as a representative case 
of deteriorating institutions and the persistence of the cost-based growth model. 
It will be contrasted with Estonia, which represents the high-road path to growth. 
The comparison of the two countries will help to understand the political processes, 
which lie behind the different growth models.
Divergence in institutions and growth models in Estonia 
and Hungary
In 2010 Hungary and Estonia were roughly at the same level of development 
(Fig. 2). In the 1990s they were the frontrunners among post-Communist countries 
in committing to a strategy of FDI-led growth, which was followed by the rest of 
the region. From the beginning, their main difference can be found in the role of the 
state, which has clearly visible consequences in the developments of the post-2010 
period. By analyzing these two cases, we can understand the relationship between 
the institutional system and the chances to overcome the MIT.
Divergence in transition and institutions
A complete break with the Soviet past and accession to the West became an essential 
element of the emerging new Estonian identity following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. In the economy, this was reflected in the adherence to a strict neoliberal pol-
icy, which includes the flat tax, a currency board exchange rate system, balanced 
budget, and rapid privatization to foreigners. The latter was primarily driven by 
fear so that the Russian minority would not acquire significant property (Bohle and 
Greskovits 2012: 100). The exclusion of Russian nationals from the political process 
significantly reduced the political obstacles to reforms. Following macroeconomic 
stabilization and trade liberalization, the new government, led by Mart Laar, focused 
on securing property rights and the rule of law. These were critical to attracting FDI, 
which was an essential element of the economic strategy. The reforms also included 
the fight against corruption, but there was no independent institution set up for this 
purpose—the solution was seen in radical market reforms, strengthening courts and 
civil society, and getting rid of people with ties to the Soviet past (Laar 2007: 7).
In contrast to Estonia, Hungary had a more consensual type of transition, during 
which there was no sharp break with the past. Even 30  years after the transition, 
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the Kádár-era—named after the Communist leader of Hungary between 1956 and 
1988—is still the most popular period in twentieth century Hungarian history, espe-
cially among those who were adults at the time (Szabó and Gerő 2019: 66). The 
economic transition began long before the first free elections, thus unlike in other 
countries of the region, a macroeconomic shock therapy, which means the paral-
lel process of stabilization and liberalization, could be avoided, and a more gradual 
transition path followed (Csaba 1995: 195). Hungary was in fact at the forefront 
of the reforms due to its early decision to open privatization to foreign investors—
given the significant level of inherited foreign debt, which needed to be financed 
(Bod 2019: 23–24). Continuity with the past was represented by the welfare state, 
the preservation of which was a social expectation, especially during the period of 
transformational recession and rising unemployment (Bohle and Greskovits 2012: 
154). Paternalistic expectations and dependence on the state set the ground for prof-
ligate fiscal policies that led to the financial crisis in 2008 and weakened the poten-
tial for social resistance to authoritarian tendencies after 2010 (Győrffy 2020: 806).
The impact of different transitions could not be traced in the institutional quality 
of Estonia and Hungary in the early period of the transition. During the EU acces-
sion process, both countries implemented the necessary reforms that led to a stable 
improvement in the quality of governance. However, after accession, this process 

















Hungary 1998 Estonia 1998 Hungary 2008
Estonia 2008 Hungary 2019 Estonia 2019
Fig. 11  Quality of governance in Estonia and Hungary (1998, 2008, 2019). Data: World Governance 
Indicators, available: http:// govin dicat ors. org
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trends based on the World Governance Indicators. The quality of governance is rep-
resented by the size of the area delineated by the different dimensions. As we can 
see on the figure, by 2018 an enormous gap took shape between the two countries.
In Estonia, the transition to a market economy also meant the spread of market 
solutions in public administration. The appointments were subject to competition 
and those, who held office during the Soviet system, had a significant disadvantage 
(Kalnins 2017: 112–113). The practices of new public management were intro-
duced, which implied a wide-ranging decentralization—reflecting a keen distrust of 
all types of centralization due to the legacy of the Soviet past (Sarapuu and Saarniit 
2020: 323).
The most visible element of institutional reforms in Estonia is the E-Estonia pro-
gram, which serves transparency, efficiency, and the reduction of transaction costs 
in the economy. Since 2002, every citizen has a digital ID and signature that allows 
them to do almost everything online from paying taxes to voting—the exceptions are 
marriage, divorce and real estate sales. Vassil (2015: 19) estimates that even if we 
calculate with only 5 min saving of time in each interaction, the system has saved 
thousands of years by 2014. Presumably, this effect is also reflected in the strong 
entrepreneurial attitudes as shown in Fig. 4.
Hungary took a completely different path. After the accession to the EU, there 
was no longer any external incentive for the development of the institutional system. 
Once Viktor Orbán became prime minister with a constitutional majority in 2010, a 
completely new administrative strategy was formulated, which aimed at the centrali-
zation of public administration—a significant U-turn after decades of decentraliza-
tion (Kornai 2015). The changes do not fit into public administration reform trends 
in the West but represent a new illiberal practice (Hajnal and Rosta 2019). The cen-
tralization of decision-making rights, the politicization of public administration, the 
devaluation of expertise and the weakening of traditional standards of bureaucracy 
are the main features (Hajnal 2021). These changes significantly weakened the insti-
tutional checks and balances providing the opportunity for the abuse of state power. 
This implies a business environment radically different from the Estonian case.
Divergent approaches to growth
Estonian policymakers built the foundation for high-quality growth during the first 
decade of the transition. Since significant deindustrialization took place during the 
1990s, they focused heavily on the services sector. Among the three most important 
services—transport, information and communication technology (ICT), construc-
tion—ICT was seen as the most promising. The knowledge base of the sector was 
the physical research institutes inherited from Soviet times, including the Cyber-
netics Institute, established in 1960, which proved to be a major asset for the new 
economy (Mets 2018: 91–92). Already in 1996, policymakers were paying atten-
tion to ICT, which appeared in the 1997 Tiger Leap ICT strategy—as a result 97% 
of schools connected to the Internet. In 2002, a program of knowledge-based Esto-
nia was launched, using Michael Porter’s model of competitive development as a 
reference. R&D expenditure was set to increase to 1.5% of GDP (Mets 2018: 93). 
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An important part of the knowledge-based strategy was to improve the quality of 
the education system—already in 2002 Estonia spent 20% of the total government 
expenditure on education, while the same year Hungary spent only 11% (Avlijas 
2020: 627). In addition, there is a strong emphasis on entrepreneurship education, 
which is taught at all universities (Mets 2017: 125). These factors explain the strong 
performance in various innovation indicators that was presented in the previous 
section.
Hungary opted for a very different path. After being a frontrunner in the transi-
tion with its FDI-led, export-based growth model, fiscal overspending from 2001 
led to increasing debt levels, a significant current account deficit and eventually to 
the 2008 financial crisis.6 Following the crisis, macroeconomic policy focused on 
stabilizing imbalances and increasing employment (Matolcsy and Palotai 2019: 9). 
Unlike in Estonia, where the currency board and later the introduction of the euro 
in 2011 prevented the use of independent monetary policy, lower interest rates and 
the subsequent weakening of the Hungarian currency (Fig. 10) played a critical role 
in ensuring cost-based competitiveness of Hungarian products and balancing the 
current account. The employment rate was increased through cutting welfare pay-
ments and the deregulation of the labor market—the measures include the shortest 
unemployment benefit duration in the EU with 3 months, which is in sharp contrast 
with the 6–12  month duration in the Baltic states (Avlijas 2020: 635). Following 
the financial crisis, real unit labor costs (RULC) fell until 2015 and then grew only 
slowly—the wage share remained below 45% of GDP by 2019, compared with over 
50% before the crisis.7 However, devaluation made the increase in wages in domes-
tic currency possible, and together with the availability of cheap loans this contrib-
uted to the recovery in consumption, which also stimulated growth (Matolcsy and 
Palotai 2019: 16).
Beyond macroeconomic stabilization and increasing employment rate, the most 
important element of Hungarian economic policy is increasing the share of domestic 
ownership in selected sectors of the economy—to counter the dependence on FDI 
and strengthen the powerbase of the government. This was achieved through differ-
ential treatment of the manufacturing and the service sector. Mobile, manufacturing 
FDI is highly encouraged and supported—as a result, following the financial crisis, 
Hungary has been the most successful country in the region in attracting automo-
tive FDI mainly due to low wages and significant state aid (Pavlinek 2017: 23). In 
contrast, the service sector became a target for nationalization, especially in energy, 
transport, and the financial sector (Voszka 2018: 1287–1288). New Hungarian own-
ers were also created in the private sector—mainly through channeling EU funds 
to selected companies close to the government, especially in construction (Szanyi 
2019: 15–16).
Macroeconomic consolidation and ownership restructuring in the economy did 
not require improving the institutional system—in fact, the dismantling of checks 
7 Data: AMECO database, code: ALCD0.
6 For an overview of the crisis see Győrffy (2018): 147–190 as well as Király (2020).
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and balances was viewed as necessary in these processes.8 There was no incentive 
to invest in knowledge and education either—as shown by Fig. 6 and 7, Hungary 
fell behind in the share of graduates as well as PISA scores. Still, the government 
achieved its limited objectives—during the pre-coronavirus period macroeconomic 
imbalances disappeared, the employment rate increased, and Hungary registered a 
steady growth rate even if it is not outstanding by regional comparison. At the same 
time, the country has been unable to overcome the problem of MIT as productivity 
declined and even in the high-tech car industry there is a specialization on low-value 
added activities and a competitiveness based on low costs (Rechnitzer et al. 2017). 
Without institutional development, strengthening entrepreneurship and creating con-
ditions for a knowledge-based economy, this strategy cannot lead to convergence.9 
The Hungarian case thus stands in sharp contrast with Estonia, where high-quality 
institutions ensure forward looking policies and produce a favorable business envi-
ronment, where entrepreneurs can thrive, and innovation can flourish.
Conclusions
The paper provided an overview about the convergence performance of the CEE 
region between two major crisis—the 2009–2013 financial crisis and the COVID-19 
pandemic. Two decades after the transition, the main task during this period was to 
overcome the MIT, which essentially means a shift from cost-based to quality-based 
growth. Except for Slovakia, all countries have moved closer to the EU average, but 
this quantitative similarity hides significant divergence—while the Czechia, Slove-
nia and Estonia are on track towards a knowledge-intensive, high-quality growth 
model, the rest of the region continues to compete primarily on a cost basis. With-
out increasing productivity, growth becomes a function of attracting additional labor 
and capital into the region, which has clear limits given the declining population and 
the expected decline of FDI-flows due to the new technological revolution.
The paper underlined the significance of institutions, especially the rule of law in 
making the transition from cost-based to quality-based growth. However, the com-
parative cases of Estonia and Hungary also indicated the problem of path depend-
ency in institutional change—while a clean break with its Communist past helped 
Estonia in building a high-quality institutional environment, the lingering heritage 
of the Communist past in Hungary together with the financing opportunities pro-
vided by the EU contributed to institutional backsliding and the persistence of the 
cost-based growth model.
Neither the MIT, nor the problems presented by institutional path dependence are 
specific to the CEE region. Further research is needed to apply the findings to other 
regions with different heritage such as the Southern member states of the EU. Such 
8 As a consequence, Hungary became a paradigmatic case of democratic backsliding. Discussing the 
specifics of this process is beyond the scope of this paper. For a comparative perspective of the trans-
formation of the Hungarian political regime see f. ex. Győrffy (2020) or Magyar and Madlovics (2020).
9 This assessment is widely shared among Hungarian economists—see Csaba (2019).
 D. Győrffy 
analysis seems especially timely as the new budget of the EU for 2021–2027 and the 
Next Generation EU Fund provide the opportunity for EU member states to make 
the transition to a knowledge-intensive and high-quality growth model. Institutions 
are critical in this process given their impact on the business environment and the 
quality of policymaking. The inclusion of the rule of law conditionality is a signifi-
cant step forward. Strictly enforcing the new regulations during the distribution of 
the funds can contribute to breaking path dependency and is probably as important 
for development as the funds themselves.
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